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Abstract
When parents divorce and have common children, the parents have to agree on how
much each parent should contribute to cover the expenses of common children. We call this
the divorced-parents problem. When parents cannot reach an agreement, they can start a
law case. In many cases the situation can be easily settled by a judge, but finding a solution
for complicated situations with parents having multiple children from different partners is
considerably more difficult. In fact, it is observed that judges lack methods to find a good
and consistent solutions. As a result, it occurs that in similar situations, the outcomes of
the court cases are different, thereby leading to inequalities in law. In yet other cases,
outcomes are even in direct conflict with the decisions of the Dutch supreme court.
In this note we develop an algorithm to find the unique proportionally fair distribution
for the divorced-parents problem. Such a proportionally fair distribution has at least three
advantages. The existence of a unique solution may prevent parents to resettle the distri-
bution via court procedures, which are (very) costly for parents and society. Second, it can
be computed efficiently so it can easily cope with changes in income, schooling costs, and so
on. Third, the solution generalizes the proportional rule that is currently applied to simple
two-parents-one-child networks to larger networks.
1 Introduction
When two Dutch parents divorce and have common children, they both have a financial re-
sponsibility to cover the monthly expenses of the children, for housing, schooling, and so on.
The legal process to determine the financial contribution of each parent to each child works
roughly as follows. First, a mediator, or a judge, establishes a network that formalizes which
parent is financially responsible for which child; this is not always easy, for instance, in the
presence of step parents. Next, the mediator uses rules to determine the financial need of
each child and the financial capacity of each parent. These rules are partly based on (case)
law and partly on specific circumstances such as income, schooling costs, and so on. Once the
network of responsibilities, capacities and needs is specified, it remains to determine a distri-
bution of contributions of the parents to the children. Henceforth we refer to this problem as
the divorced-parents problem.
Based on an analysis of multiple law cases, Jonker et al. [2020] establish the following rules
that Dutch judges strive to use to solve the divorced-parents problem:
1. Parental capacity is meant to be ‘used’ for its purpose, in other words, a child cannot have
a shortage unless both its parents already spent their full capacity.
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2. When two parents of one (or multiple common) child have an overage, distribute the
overage of the parents relative to the capacity that each parent has available for the
child.
3. Children of one parent should be treated equally, for instance, children born in later
marriages should have the same rights as children born in earlier marriages.
4. The capacities of all parents should be taken into account, to the extent possible. In other
words, if a parent has obligations towards multiple children, the old and new partners
should also take responsibility for the children of the parent.
In the sequel we say that a distribution, or a solution, is proportionally fair when it satisfies
these rules.
In the simple case of two parents and one child (or multiple ‘equal’ and common children),
the law cases directly apply the above rules to distribute parental overages, and it is easy to see
that this distribution is unique. However, most situations that are brought to court are consid-
erably more complicated. For instance, one case mentions one woman having five children from
four different partners, and the partners’ jobs and incomes vary on a nearly monthly basis. In
these more difficult cases, Jonker et al. [2020] show that judges attempt to find a proportion-
ally fair solution, but have to settle on approximations due to the complexities of computations.
These approximations, however, have significant drawbacks. First, for more or less similar sit-
uations, the distributions can differ significantly, thereby leading to legal inequalities between
cases. Second, as the manual computation of even approximately fair distributions is (very)
time-consuming, the contributions of the parents are not updated even when there are signifi-
cant changes in income, newly born children, and so on. These problems give rise to additional
conflicts between ex-spouses when they perceive the settlements as ‘unfair’ or ‘arbitrary’; these
conflicts sometimes lead again to new (costly and lengthy) court cases.
In this paper we prove that a unique proportionally fair solution exists for the divorced-
parent problem for networks of arbitrary size, and we provide an algorithm to compute this
distribution. The existence of a solution was earlier proved by Moulin and Sethuraman [2013]
but they do not provide an algorithm to actually compute the solution.
2 Model and Proof
Parents and children are represented as nodes in a directed bi-partite graph. Parents have (fi-
nancial) capacities d = (d1, . . . ,dM) to cover the (financial) needs b= (b1, . . . ,bN ) of the children.
The children for whom a parent is (financially) responsible are represented by directed arcs
from the parent to the children. We use the δ function to represent the parent-child relations;
δi j = 1 when parent i is responsible for child j, otherwise δi j = 0. Note that these relations can
also be enforced by setting the transportation cost ci j = (1−δi j)/δi j from node i to node j.
Parent i pays a (care) contribution xi j ≥ 0 to child j; of course, xi j = 0 when δi j = 0. For a




δi jxi j, (1)
and the budget that parent i has available for child j after meeting all its obligations to all
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other children for whom s/he is responsible as




Analogously, define the shortage of child j as




We write y= (y1, . . . , yM) and z= (z1, . . . , zN ). Note that y and z depend on the payments matrix
x= {xi j}.
The max-flow problem is equivalent to finding a solution for Rule 1 of the Introduction, and





z j ; x≥ 0, y≥ 0, z≥ 0
}
. (3)
The constraints are evident: the parental contributions x cannot be negative; parents pay at
most their capacity, hence y ≥ 0; and children receive at most their need, hence z ≥ 0. (The
inequality y≥ 0 means yi ≥ 0 for each term.)
In case the solution lies on a corner of the feasible set, this LP suffices to find the optimal
solution. However, when multiple solutions exist, we can Rule 2 of the Introduction to dis-
tribute any overages and shortages in a fair way. For this, we first assume that we deal with a
network in which all parents have an overages, hence y> 0 and z= 0. Then we discuss general
networks.
2.1 A network with overages
In a proportional distribution, the overages for parents i and k that are both responsible for
child j should be such that the relative overages of both parents are the same. Recalling (1)






where yi/(yi+ xi j) has the interpretation of the overage of parent i relative to the total budget
that parent i has at its disposal to meet the needs of child j. From (1) and (2) we see that






In words, instead of proportionally distributing the relative overages we can just as well dis-
tribute the relative payments of the parents.
Now observe that (5) together with the assumption y > 0 imply that xi j/yi = xk j/yk, which
in turn implies that there exists a proportionality factor β j > 0 such that xi j = β j yi. Observe
that xi j > 0 since yi > 0 by assumption. When parent yi is not responsible for child x j we have
that δi j = 0. Thus, we have established that
xi j = δi j yiβ j. (6)
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Next, as we are dealing with a network with overages, we can impose the condition that
z= 0, i.e., all needs are satisfied. In particular, for child j this means that
z j = 0 ⇐⇒
∑
i
δi jxi j = b j. (7)
Substitute the expression (6) for xi j into this equation to see that β j must satisfy β j
∑
kδk j yk =
b j. From yk > 0 it follows that
∑
kδk j yk > 0 for each child j, thereby allowing us to write
β j = b j/∑kδk j yk. Let us substitute this into (6) to obtain
xi j = δi j yi∑
kδk j yk
b j. (8)










Thus, suppose we can find a vector of overages y > 0 that solves (9). Then, with (8), we
can find a set of parental contributions x ≥ 0. It is clear from the construction that x satisfies
Rule 1, namely by (7). Moreover, Rule 2 is simultaneously satisfied via (5) and (4).
In fact, we can compute a unique solution for (9) with recursion, thereby proving the exis-
tence of a unique solution for the divorced parents problem. To this end, define the ith compo-








for a set v> 0 of overages. Observe that with this, (9) reduces to yi f i(y)= di.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that there is a vector v> 0 such that vk fk(v)≥ dk for all its components
vk, and vi f i(v)> di for the ith component. Take
v′i = di/ f i(v).
Then we have that i. 0< v′i < vi, and ii. v′i f (v′)> di.
Proof. i.) Observe that vi f i(v)> di =⇒ vi > di/ f i(v)= v′i. Next, v> 0 =⇒ f (v)> 0, hence v′ > 0.
ii.) Use the definition v′i = di/ f i(v) to reduce the inequality v′i f i(v′) > di to the inequality
f i(v′) > f i(v). But this latter inequality directly follows from the definition of f and observing
that, by i., v′i < vi and v′k ≤ vk.
The solution y now follows straightaway computed from recursion. Take v0 = d > 0; the
argument being that the overages can never exceed the capacities. From the definition of f ,
we see that f (v0) > 1, so that v0i f i(v0) > di for all i. Next, define v1i = di/ f i(v0). By the above
lemma, v1 < v and again v1i f i(v1) > di. Thus, we can apply this lemma again to v1 to obtain
v2i = di/ f i(v1) < v1i , and so on. Clearly, this recursive procedure yields a monotone decreasing
set of vectors vn that is bounded from below since vn > 0 for all n. Then, by the theorem of
Weierstrass, it follows that vn converges to a unique limit point y. This limit point y must
satisfy (9), for if yi f i(y)> 0 for some i, we can use the lemma to find a smaller vector.
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2.2 General networks
In the previous section we assume that there was an overage, i.e., y> 0. Let us show how we
can apply the same method to a general network. For this we need to split the network into
two sub networks, one in which parents have an overage, and the other part in which children
have a shortage. Thus, the overage and shortage networks are complementary: each parent
(child) must belong to either the overage or the shortage network. The LP (3) proves a highly
device to split the network.
In more detail, we associate a Lagrange multiplier λ with the constraint y≥ 0, and µ with
z ≥ 0. In the optimal solution, when yi > 0, it is clear that parent i should be assigned to the
overage network. Next, by complementary slackness, when λi > 0 for parent i, yi = 0. Hence,
any marginal increase in the capacity of parent i can be used to reduce the shortage of a child.
Thus, such a parent i must necessarily belong to the shortage network. By analogy, when z j > 0
(µ j > 0) child j belongs to the shortage (overage) network.
It may happen that the solution is degenerate such that yi = λi = 0 for parent i. To find
out to which sub-network we should assign this parent, we propose to add an extra constraint
yi > 1 with multiplier νi and solve this augmented LP. With complementary slackness the
assignment can follow the same reasoning as earlier, and similar for children with z j =µ j = 0.










with ²¿ 1. The solution of this satisfies our requirements. To see this, observe that in a
degenerate solution of the LP, it is possible to ‘move money’ from one parent to another without
affecting the value of the objective (3) of the LP. However, in the non-linear objective, it is
optimal to keep the largest yi as small as possible so that, as a consequence, the smallest
overage will be as large as possible, as long as this does not affect the objective of the LP.
Likewise reasoning applies to the shortages z.
With the algorithm of the previous section we can divide overages in an overage network
proportionally over the parents. Interestingly, the same algorithm can be used to proportionally
distribute the shortages of children in a shortage network. For this, consider the transpose of
the shortage network. In other words, we swap the roles of the parents and the children, and
we obtain a network in which there is a ‘surplus of needs’. Then we apply the algorithm to
proportionally distribute these ‘surplus of needs’.
Thus, by applying the algorithm first to the overage network and then to the transpose of
the shortage network we find a solution for the entire network.
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